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Summary
We analyze the optimal investment strategy of a monopolist which has subscribed a
concession contract to provide a public utility, i.e. water service. We present a strategic
model in which a monopolist chooses both the timing of the investment and the
capacity. We focus not only on the value of the immediate investment, but rather on the
value of the investment opportunity. We then extend the model to two interdependent
projects, where investing in the first project provides the opportunity to acquire the
benefits of the new investment by making a new outlay. We show that flexibility to
defer an investment may generate, ceteris paribus, additional profits which may induce
positive effects in terms of policy and consumers surplus.
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In recent years water sector reforms have concentrated on involving the pri-
vate sector in the operation and management of water utilities. In Italy
following the promulgation of Law 36/94, known as Legge Galli, an attempt
has been made to open up the water service sector to competition in order
to guarantee e¢ ciency in production and management of the resource (de-
clared to be scarce).1 The increase in the opportunity cost of investments
devoted to the provision of public services has induced the Government to
promote the involvement of private ￿rms in the production of water ser-
vices. The aim is to capture new ￿nancial resources and reduce the ine¢ -
ciency which has characterized the public production of water services up to
now (Dosi and Muraro, 2003). Unlike what has happened in telecommuni-
cations where technological innovations eroding some monopolistic aspects
have introduced competition into the sector, the structural and technical
characteristics of the water sector constrain the legislator to promote e¢ -
ciency through ￿competition for the market￿(Muraro and Rebba, 2003).2 3
In other words the private ￿rms interested in provision of the water service
compete to be entitled to a contract which gives them the right to pro-
duce, operate and manage the water utilities for a certain period of time.
Under Law n￿ 36/94 the legislator establishes a separation between water
resource planning and the operation of water utilities. The resource plan-
ning is assigned to the local water authority (ATO)4 which, in turn, assigns
the operation to a private provider which will be selected via an auction
1See Muraro (2003).
2It is not reasonable to construct parallel pipelines to distribute drinking water and
collect wastewater. An exception is represented by common carriage competition in Great
Britain (Webb and Ehrhardt, 1998), where several water utilities compete for customers
using a single set of pipes. This solution might be adopted for providing the service to big
industrial users but it is di¢ cult to implement for domestic users because of the existence
of strong economies of scale and scope (Dosi and Muraro, 2003).
3The water sector is characterized by some constraints related to the nature of the
resource itself and to technological and physical features of the infrastructures (i.e. water
￿ ows by gravity in the network). These put some limitations on network interconnections
and provision of the service on a large scale.
4The Galli Law establishes new local water authorities (ATOs), whose borders are set
by the Italian Regions. As an example of their jurisdiction consider that in Veneto Region
there are 8 local water authorities. The ATO are now taking over control functions which
were previously state-run (decentralization). Generally speaking the term ATO refers to
both the water authority and the area where the authority operates. When the reform is
accomplished, only one private ￿rm will operate in each ATO.
2mechanism. The ATO sets the price (tari⁄)5 cap for the water utilities
(including aqueduct systems, sewerage systems and treatment plants). Fur-
thermore, the ATO draws up the ￿Piano d￿ Ambito￿(a 30 year plan) which
includes the timing and level of infrastructure investments, and ensures that
the provider ful￿lls the contract requirements.
In this speci￿c case, the ￿Piano d￿ Ambito￿ sets out the typology and
timing of the investments the provider has to make, ruling out any manage-
rial ￿ exibility. Designers and planners choose among di⁄erent alternative
technical solutions (e.g. ground water vs. river basin abstraction, branch-
ing pipe systems vs. interconnected pipe systems, etc.) and make capital
budgeting decisions according to the Net Present Value (NPV) rule.
Nevertheless, a wide range of feasible alternative technical solutions ex-
ists from which designers and planners can choose as regards operation and
management of the infrastructures making up the system. Technological
innovations lead to the construction of more complex systems characterized
by a high operational ￿ exibility. It is quite common today to design ￿in-
tegrated￿aqueduct systems (namely vertical integrated systems with sev-
eral interconnections between the network infrastructures) which can be
expanded by sequential or modularized investments (Zanovello, 1977). Such
systems can easily be modi￿ed over time in order to meet the requirements
of facing and adapting to changes in the state variables (e.g. average day
demand, number of users, input costs, adoption of new technologies, etc.).
Moreover the interconnection and integration between supply sources en-
ables the system to handle crisis in the provision of the service caused, for
example, by pollution emergencies or peaks in day demand curves.
This ￿ exibility, arising from technical aspects, has an economic value,
which is strongly related to the provider￿ s ￿ability￿to decide whether and
when it is optimal to invest. That is, a ￿rm which has the possibility to
decide whether and when it is optimal to invest is holding something like a
￿nancial (call) option. By deciding to exploit this ￿opportunity￿ , the ￿rm
exercises its (real) option and consequently pays an opportunity cost which
becomes part of the investment costs.
In recent years, following early papers by Brennan and Schwartz (1985),
McDonald and Siegel (1985, 1986), Majd and Pindyck (1987) and Paddock et
al. (1988), there has been an increasing production of literature concerning
5The Law n
￿ 36/94 de￿nes a new pricing mechanism. The tari⁄determined on the basis
of ￿Metodo Tari⁄ario Normalizzato￿(ex. Lege: ￿Decreto del Ministero dell￿ Ambiente e
del Territorio I
￿ agosto 1996￿ ) introduces a price cap regulation which guarantees at the
same time ex-post full recovery of the service costs and an ￿adequate￿ capital rate of
return (Moretto and Valbonesi, 2003).
3applications of the real option approach to investment decisions in varied
industrial sectors.6 Teisberg (1993) and Saphores et al. (2004) apply the
real option approach to regulated ￿rms in the energy sector, while Teisberg
(1994), Trigeorgis (1996) and Childs and Triantis (1999) are among the few
interested in the analysis of multi-stage investments in R&D. Nevertheless,
these contributions do not refer to interdependent projects concerned with
di⁄erent capacity levels to be realized by regulated ￿rms.7
This paper is a ￿rst attempt to apply real option results to capital bud-
geting in the water service as a regulated sector. We present a simple model
to value the ￿ exibility of aqueduct systems. The aqueduct systems are char-
acterized by a high degree of technological and operational ￿ exibility and,
among the water utility infrastructures, are the ones which require higher
irreversible sunk costs.8 In particular our aim is to show that managerial
and technical ￿ exibility might turn out to be economically relevant in the
case the ￿Piano d￿ Ambito￿gives to the provider the option to strategically
decide when to invest.9 We also correct the option value to take into account
that the length of concession contracts is generally shorter than plants￿use-
ful life. Finally we investigate the e⁄ects of ￿ exibility on consumer surplus
and tari⁄ reduction.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simpli￿ed
model to value the ￿ exibility to defer investments. Section 3 deals with
investment decisions in capacity expansion (i.e. a water abstraction plant)
and investigates the pro￿tability of devising interdependent projects to face
uncertain future demand. Section 4 illustrates the concluding remarks.
6See also Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) for a systematic treatment
of the real option approach.
7Interdependent projects di⁄er from multi-stage projects because in order to generate
a stream of pro￿ts they do not require an earlier investment-installment cost to acquire
a subsequent option to continue operating the project until the next installment becomes
due (see Trigeorgis, 1996, Chapter 4).
861% of the total turnover of the water service sector industry is represented by pro￿ts
coming from the production and distribution of water (in 1999 it was equal to 3.85 billion
Euros). The 2002 report to the Italian Parliament on the state of the art of the water
sector and accomplishment of the reform laid down by the Galli Law points out the need
for huge investments (15.78 Euros per year per capita) in the aqueduct system in order
to improve the e¢ ciency of existing infrastructures, search for new catchment areas and
springs and construct new plants.
9However the supply of the service is obligatory.
42 The model
The aim of this section is to show how ￿ exibility can be valued with reference
to plants for the production of drinking water. To emphasize the role of ￿ ex-
ibility embedded in water production plants, we introduce some simplifying
assumptions in order to obtain a close form solution for the investment￿ s
value.10
Conventional capital budgeting techniques and in particular the NPV
rule fail to capture the strategic impact of projects and the additional value
deriving from the opportunity to delay an investment decision. The NPV
rule gives a measure of an investment￿ s pro￿tability according to a now-or-
never proposition, that is if the investor does not make the investment now,
he will lose the opportunity forever. A project whose NPV is negative or
equal to zero, though, might have a positive NPV in the future. Similarly
a project whose NPV is positive might have an even greater NPV in the
future. Therefore the NPV rule does not take into consideration the oppor-
tunity cost to delay the investment. By deciding to make an expenditure for
an irreversible investment the investor gives up the possibility of waiting for
new information that might a⁄ect the desirability or the timing of the in-
vestment itself should market conditions change adversely. This opportunity
cost might be relevant in the water service sector where only a private ￿rm
has the right to make the investment. The ability to defer an irreversible
investment expenditure might profoundly a⁄ect the decision to invest.
The real option approach, ￿rst proposed by Myers (1977), Kester (1984)
and McDonald and Siegel (1986)11, establishes a theoretical framework which
permits introduction into the valuation model of the ￿ exibility to postpone
investments, whose value is not captured by NPV. In other words the real
option approach provides the decision-maker with a tool to address the issues
of irreversibility, uncertainty and timing, drawing the valuation procedures
from the body of knowledge developed for ￿nancial options during the past
decades.
The investor with an opportunity to invest is holding something like a
￿nancial call option where the investment project is the underlying asset, the
10We believe that the adoption of more sophisticated models which can be solved only
by means of numerical methods would not give any additional value to the analysis and
would not make any improvment in the quality of the results, owing to the quality of
information the ATOs and the providers have at their disposal while awaiting the reform
(Law 36/94) to be accomplished soon.
11To learn about the theory of the real option approach and for an overview of recent
developments, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996).
5investment costs represent the strike price and the expiry of the concession
contract is the upper bound of the call option￿ s maturity time.
2.1 An investment in capacity expansion
We use a simpli￿ed version of the model proposed by McDonald and Siegel
(1986). In particular:
1. The investment project A is a large-scale project which generates, once
installed, an instantaneous pro￿t ￿ ow equal to:
￿A
t = ￿t(XA)
where XA is the project￿ s dimension (expressed in m3).
2. The project lifetime is Tu, i.e. at Tu the salvage value is zero.
3. ￿t evolves over time according to a geometric Brownian motion with




t dt + ￿￿A
t dzt with ￿A
0 =￿A (1)
where dzt is the increment of a standard Brownian process with mean
zero and variance dt (i.e. E(dzt) = 0 and E(dz2
t) = dt). From (1) we
get E(￿A
t j ￿A) = ￿Ae￿t, therefore ￿ represents the expected cash
￿ ow growth rate.
4. Investment in project A entails a sunk capital cost IA:
5. The investment exercise time is ￿.
Since the investment project we are analyzing (aqueduct system) is not
traded in limited supply for investment purposes by many investors it is not
considered a traded asset. Therefore its expected rate of return ￿ falls below
the equilibrium total expected rate of return, say ^ ￿, required in the market
by investors from an equivalent-risk traded ￿nancial security. The result-
ing rate of return shortfall ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0 (i.e. the di⁄erence between the
equilibrium expected return on a similar traded ￿nancial security and the
actual project drift, ￿, on the non-traded asset) represents the opportunity
cost (in annuity terms) to invest at time zero, i.e. it is analogous to a con-
stant ￿dividend￿yield.12 Furthermore, since the equivalent traded ￿nancial
12In complete markets we can hypotesize the existence of a traded asset that maintains
the same price as ￿
A while it pays a constant dividend yield ￿, with b ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ (see
McDonald and Siegel, 1984; Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985).
6security must satisfy the asset price equilibrium relationship ^ ￿ = r + RP;
where r is the risk-free rate and RP is the risk premium, we can write the
expected risk-adjusted rate of return of the project as ￿￿RP = r￿￿ where
r ￿ ￿ will be referred to hereafter as the cost of carry.
This is the basis of the risk-neutral valuation approach proposed by Cox
and Ross (1976) and Harrison and Kreps (1979), in which the actual growth
rate ￿ is replaced with a risk-neutral equivalent drift r ￿ ￿. That is, the
adjustment is analogous to discounting certainty-equivalent cash ￿ ows at
the risk-free rate, so that we can rewrite (1) in the following form:
d￿A
t = (r ￿ ￿)￿A
t dt + ￿￿A
t dzt ￿A
0 = ￿A (2)
Hence, given the current value of ￿A
t ; the market value of the project can
be evaluated as the expected present value of discounted cash ￿ ows using
equivalent risk-neutral probabilities and the risk-free interest rate (Cox and
Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979):









(1 ￿ e￿￿Tu) (3)
where E denotes the expectation operator under the risk neutral probability
measure. Since V A is a multiple of ￿A it is also driven by a geometric
Brownian motion with the same parameters r ￿ ￿ and ￿, i.e.:
dV A
t = (r ￿ ￿)V A
t dt + ￿V A
t dzt; V A
0 = V A (4)
This means that the analysis could be replicated using the present value
as the state variable. Hereinafter we may take V A
t as the primitive exogenous
state variable for the regulatory process. The above assumptions make the
project￿ s value of the opportunity to invest (Extended Net Present Value)
analogous to a European call option on a constant dividend-paying asset
(the plant), i.e.:
FA(V A







where ￿ is the expiration date and V A
￿ is the project value at time ￿.
Imposing a non-arbitrage condition, the extended net present value FA(Vt;t)
can be obtained as the solution of the following second order di⁄erential




V V + (r ￿ ￿)(V A)FA
V ￿ rFA ￿ FA
t = 0 (5)
7subject to the terminal condition:
FA(V A
￿ ;￿) = max[(V A
￿ ￿ IA)+;0] (6)
and to the boundary conditions:




t = 1 (7)
The solution of (5) is given by the well-known formula derived by Black
and Scholes (1973):
FA(V A
t ;t) = e￿￿(￿￿t)￿(d1)V A










t ) = d1(V A
t ) ￿ ￿
p
￿ ￿ t
and ￿(￿) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
So far we have implicitly assumed that the ￿rm can exploit the pro￿ts
generated by the project for its entire lifetime, once it is realized. However,
concession contracts have a limited length, around 30 years, generally shorter
than the project lifetime. Therefore it is necessary to add, at least, two more
assumptions to take into account the limited contract life. In particular:
7. The concession contract lasts for Tc years, so that ￿ ￿ Tc < Tu.
8. The salvage value is given by:
S = IAe￿￿(Tc￿￿)=￿
Then, by assumption 7 in order to calculate the asset value we must
consider the operating life (i.e. economic life) of the project instead of its
useful life (i.e. technical life). Consequently whenever the provider decides
to defer the investment, he reduces the time over which he can gain pro￿ts
by running the plant. Assumption 8, simply assume a salvage value as a %
of the replacement cost. This % depreciates at rate ￿ over the remaining
years to the end of the concession. Therefore if the ￿rm invests at ￿ = 0 the
salvage value is obviously equal to zero but if the ￿rm invests close to the
end of the concession, ￿ = Tc , the salvage value coincides the replacement
cost.
The actual value of the project turns out to be less than (3) and equals
to:










(1 ￿ e￿￿(Tc￿￿)) + IAe￿(r+
￿
￿ )(Tc￿￿)





￿ ;￿) = lim
￿!Tc
max[(V A
￿ ￿ ^ IA)+;0] = 0 (10)




Interdependent projects can be considered as a portfolio of growth options.
We extend the above benchmark case of a single indivisible project assum-
ing that the provider has the possibility of choosing between two alternative
projects A and B of di⁄erent scales. With respect to the assumptions pre-
viously introduced we add:
1. Project A is equal to the one described in the previous section, while
project B is larger in scale and generates, once installed, an instanta-
neous pro￿t ￿ ow equal to ￿B
t (XB) with XB > XA.
2. The cash ￿ ow is simpli￿ed into a linear function as:
￿B
t (XB) = ￿tXB ￿A
t (XA) = ￿tXA
where ￿t is the instantaneous pro￿t per cubic meter (m3) equal for
both the projects and described by the following geometric Brownian
motion:
d￿t = (r ￿ ￿)￿tdt + ￿￿tdzt ￿0 = ￿
where r ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 is the instantaneous risk-adjusted expected rate of
return and ￿ > 0 is the instantaneous volatility.
13Brennan and Schwartz (1985) introduce a similar boundary condition. Their analysis,
though, do not take into account the reduction in the asset value, because in their case
the contract lease does not provide for any limitations on the number of years for which
the resource can be exploited.
93. Investment in projects A and B entails sunk capital costs IA and IB
respectively, with IB > IB:
4. The investor can operate only one project at a time and the investment
is constrained to be sequential, with investment A occurring before B.
5. Finally, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that for both projects
the expiration time is in￿nite.
The last two assumptions require some further comments. Firstly, since
the investment is sequential, the private ￿rm can always invest in the smaller
scale project and subsequently invest in the bigger scale one, incorporating
the former into the latter by paying an additional cost. Moreover, an in￿nite
expiration time appears to be non-restrictive referring to aqueduct systems
whose lifetime is very long. This implies that we can assume Tc = Tu = T.
Hence, the market value of the project B can be evaluated as the ex-
pected present value of its discounted cash ￿ ows.









(1 ￿ e￿￿T) (11)
Now, contrary to what has been done in the previous section, while de-
termining the market value of project A we must take into account that once
A is installed, it is optimal to switch to project B whenever the instanta-
neous pro￿t ￿ becomes large enough. In particular, we can express V A(￿)
as





t ds + e￿r￿￿ ￿
V B(￿￿￿) ￿ IB￿
)
(12)
where ￿￿ is the optimal switching time from A to B.
It is easy to check that the solution to problem (12) is to switch from A
to B as soon as ￿ exceeds the critical threshold ￿￿







(XB ￿ XA)(1 ￿ e￿￿T)
(13)


















￿￿T) represents the value of project A when there is no option
to switch.








￿2 > 1. Moreover, the project￿ s market













￿￿1 if ￿ ￿ ￿￿
AB
￿XB
￿ (1 ￿ e￿￿T) ￿ IB if ￿ > ￿￿
AB
(14)
Some comments on (14) are necessary. It is worth pointing out that for
￿ 2 (0;1) V A(￿) ￿ V B(￿). The two functions coincide if and only if ￿ = 0,
while for ￿ 2 [￿￿
AB;1) V A(￿) ￿ V B(￿) = ￿IB. In other words the current
value of project B￿ s expected cash ￿ ows is always greater than A￿ s, also
taking into consideration the value of the opportunity to switch, eventually,
from A to B at cost IB:
In order to determine under which conditions it is optimal to proceed
with sequential investments, let￿ s consider the opportunity to invest in project
A, which entails the option to switch subsequently to project B. For each





V A(￿￿￿) ￿ IA￿o
(15)
By (14) the expression for V A(￿￿￿) is non-linear in ￿, therefore there is
a discontinuity in the threshold ￿￿
A beyond which it is optimal to invest in














XA ￿ 1 ￿ IB
IA
(16)
The ￿rst expression shows that ￿￿
A < ￿￿
AB therefore it is optimal to invest
￿rst in project A and then to wait until the instantaneous pro￿t exceeds ￿￿
AB
to invest in project B incorporating A. By analyzing (16), investment in A
is myopic: it occurs as if the option of ultimately switching to B were not






On the contrary when ￿￿
A ￿ ￿￿
AB it is optimal to invest in both the
projects simultaneously and, therefore, proceed directly with the implemen-
tation of B.
113 The value of ￿ exibility to invest in an aqueduct
system
3.1 The case of a water abstraction plant
With reference to the previous section let￿ s suppose, as an example, that the
￿Piano d￿ Ambito￿plans an investment capacity expansion due to an increase
in water demand (i.e. number of users) or an increase in water supply (i.e.
average day demand per capita). In order to meet the requirements the
provider could choose between two di⁄erent alternative projects: a) buy the
volume X necessary to provide the water service to the new users via another
private ￿rm (alternative O), it being allowed by the law; b) construct a new
water abstraction plant (well ￿eld)15 designed on the basis of volume X
(alternative A).
Since the price of trading water among ATO is established by the regu-
lator according to solidarity and fairness criteria, we can form the hypoth-
esis that the expected Net Present Value of this alternative is zero, that is
NPV O = 0:
Alternative A consists of: a) well ￿eld (3 wells); b) pumping station; c)
treatment plant; d) storage system (capacity equal to 10,000 m3); e) treat-
ment plant; f) electrical system for the equipment installed. The treatment
plant includes a ￿ltration process on Granular Activated Carbon (GAC) and
the storage system includes disinfection and chlorination procedures.16 In
fact groundwater extraction guarantees the provision of good quality water,
which does not need highly speci￿c treatment to meet the regulations for
drinking water standards.
The project￿ s useful life Tu is equal to 50 years and the system guarantees
a water provision of about 300 l/s (equivalent to 9,460,800 m3=year) but it is
subject to water losses in the network i ranging from 20 to 30%: We assume
that the plant￿ s construction and installment costs are not time-dependent
and amount to about 3,500,000 Euros.
We evaluate the ￿ exibility of waiting to invest in project A, by treating
the opportunity to defer the investment as a European Call Option. As it
has already been pointed out, the discounted expected cash ￿ ows represent
15A well ￿eld is the sinking of several moderately sized boreholes, spaced apart in some
pattern, their yields being collected together. This system is used in order to develop a
good yield from an area where a single well could not be expected to guarantee a large
enough yield.
16For a more detailed overview of technical solutions, technologies and design criteria
see Hammer (1993) and Twort et al. (2000).
12the current value of the asset and the investment cost IA represents the
exercise price of the option. Assuming pro￿t is a linear function of the
dimension XA, pro￿t at time t can be written as:
￿A
t = RA
t (1 ￿ i)XA ￿ CA
t XA (17)
where RA
t are the revenues per cubic meter at time t; CA
t are operating
costs (including maintenance costs) per cubic meter0 at time t; XA is the
plant dimension; i are the volume losses in the network. We also make the
following simplifying assumptions:
1. Revenues are deterministic and we draw their value using projections
of water price and demand estimated by the ATO on the basis of the
￿Metodo Tari⁄ario Normalizzato￿ over the entire concession period.
2. The operating costs17 (sum of production, maintenance and running
costs) 18 are a random variable following a geometric Brownian motion
with a growth rate r ￿ ￿ and volatility ￿:
dCt = (r ￿ ￿)Ctdt + ￿Ctdzt
3. The risk-free discount rate r is known, deterministic and not time-
dependent.
4. Revenues can be discounted at the constant risk-free rate r, the number
of users (consumers) being certain over time (Brennan and Schwartz,
1985).
5. The discounted value of the project￿ s future cash ￿ ows is a good ap-
proximation of the present value of the asset.
6. The project￿ s salvage value at the end of its lifetime is zero.
17Variable costs, in particular the expenditure for chemicals used in water treatment
(chlorination) and energy (pumping plant), are the most relevant ones as regards an
abstraction plant consisting of wells. In this case the expenditure for chemicals is non-
signi￿cant when compared with energy costs and can therefore be ignored. The price of
energy is likely to follow an exogenous di⁄usive and geometric stochastic process.
18Fixed costs for running the plant are generally estimated as a percentage of operating
costs (20-30%) and vary signi￿cantly depending on the management and the organization
of the ￿rm running the service.
13Recalling (3), the value of the project is:19




















Estimates of costs, revenues and other variables were derived from discus-
sions with water industry experts. Table 1 shows estimates of the project￿ s


















Table 1: Summary information for alternative A.
￿Designers and industry experts interviewed agree on esti-
mating the average operational costs of this type of plant at
19Water service experts use an expected rate of return (WACC) ^ ￿ equal to 7%. This
value is the capital rate of return provided for by Law 36/94 and subsequent implemen-














where the cost growth rate is ￿. Obviously the two expressions for the project￿ s value are
equivalent.
14around 0.13 Euro/m3. The average has been calculated over a
distribution.
￿￿Revenues per cubic meter have been determined by a sta-
tistical analysis performed over a distribution whose parameters
have been estimated on the basis of the average tari⁄ paid by
users for the provision of drinking water.
￿￿￿The risk-free rate is assumed to be equal to the rate of
return of stated-owned bonds.
￿￿￿￿Variance has been estimated considering analogous in-
vestment projects realized in the past, whose operating costs
were known throughout the project life. A scenario analysis was
conducted to prove the consistency of these estimates which can
be considered representative for this kind of plant.
If the private ￿rm can decide at time ￿ = 3;5;10 years to proceed or not
with the investment, the Extended Net Present Value of the projects can
be determined using (8). Tables 2 and 3 display the results. The value of
the ￿ exibility to defer the investment (that is the di⁄erence between the Ex-
tended Net Present Value, FA, and the Net Present Value, NPV A) decreases
for increasing values of ￿ and increasing exercise time of the option.
Let￿ s consider ￿rst the case where ￿ = 30%, i = 20% and ￿ = 2%.
Project A whose NPV A is negative (NPV A = ￿700 thousands of Euros)
might have a positive NPV A in the future (e.g. FA=1.100 thousands of
Euros when ￿ = 10). Therefore, the optimal strategy is to delay the invest-
ment. On the contrary, everything else being equal and assuming i = 30%,
project A has such a highly negative NPV A that is never pro￿table either
to invest or wait to invest.
Let￿ s now consider the case where ￿ = 30% and ￿ = 3%. Assuming
i = 20%, FA is less than the corresponding NPV A, therefore there is no
advantage in deferring the investment and the provider should start con-
struction immediately. On the contrary, assuming i = 30%, FA is greater
than the corresponding NPV A and consequently it is expedient to delay the
investment.
In all other cases (i.e. ￿ = 4% and i = 20￿30%) the option value is not
high enough to suggest waiting to invest, therefore the optimal investment
strategy is to start construction immediately.
Finally, comparing Table 2 and Table 3 it is easily demonstrated that
for increasing values of ￿ the Extended Net Present Value of the project




0 3 5 10
i=20% i=30% i=20% i=30% i=20% i=30% i=20% i=30%
2% -700 -5,900 400 - 600 - 900 -
￿ 3% 6,300 1,100 6,000 1,500 5,800 1,600 5,300 1,800
4% 11,600 6,400 10,400 5,800 9,600 5,400 8,100 4,700




0 3 5 10
i=20% i=30% i=20% i=30% i=20% i=30% i=20% i=30%
2% -700 -5,900 600 - 800 - 1,100 -
￿ 3% 6,300 1,100 6,100 1,700 5,900 1,900 5,500 2,000
4% 11,600 6,400 10,500 5,900 9,700 5,600 8,300 5,000
Table 3: NPV A and FA for ￿ = 40% and di⁄erent expiration times of the
option.
As already mentioned in section 2.1, the literature on the estimate of
Extended Net Present Value in regulated industrial sectors does not consider
that in general the length of concession is shorter than the project lifetime.
This results in an over-estimation of the current value of the asset and a
consequent distortion in the option value.
For example, in the above case we assumed that the private ￿rm has
the possibility of making pro￿ts throughout the useful life of the project,
but usually concession contracts last for about 30 years. Therefore in de-
termining the asset￿ s present value we have to take into consideration the
plant￿ s operating life (economic life, Tc = 30 years) instead of its useful life
(technical life, Tu = 50 years). Consequently, by exercising the option to
defer the investment, the private ￿rm reduces the period of time over which
it can make pro￿ts from running the plant and then it reduces the expected
16revenue cash ￿ ow. In the light of these considerations the present value of
the project should be given by (9) including a salvage value.
Nevertheless, since the Galli Law does not make an explicit reference to
the procedures to be used to guarantee the ￿rm an amount of money corre-
sponding to the asset￿ s salvage value and the formula adopted to determine
the water tari⁄ (￿Metodo Tari⁄ario Normalizzato￿ ) already includes some
form of the depreciation allowances, we maintain here the assumption of
salvage value equal to zero.20 The present value of the project is now:





















while the formula for evaluating its Extended Net Present Value (8) does
not vary.
Analyzing the results obtained assuming ￿ = 30% and 40% and i = 20%
(illustrated in Figure 1 and 2 respectively) we ￿nd that, everything else
being equal, the value of ￿ exibility increases as ￿ increases but, as it has
been previously shown, it decreases when ￿ increases. It is also worth noting
that when ￿ is equal to zero the Extended Net Present Value, FA, and the
conventional Net Present Value, NPV A, coincide. In particular when ￿ is
equal to 30 years (i.e. when the concession contract ceases) the Extended
Net Present Value of the asset is zero. The option value to delay represents
the opportunity cost of waiting to invest (Figure 3 and 4).
Let￿ s consider, as an example, the scenario characterized by ￿ = 30%,
￿ = 2%. In this case the Net Present Value of the project is NPV A =
4;000;000 Euros. The extended NPV has a maximum for ￿ = 9 and it is
about FA = 4;970;000 Euros (Figure 1). Therefore the ￿rm￿ s opportunity
cost to invest by waiting 9 years is approximately 970;000 Euros or, put
di⁄erently, the Net Present Value of investing today is NPV A ￿ FA =
4;000;000 ￿ 4;970;000 = ￿970;000; i.e. the NPV of investing today which
includes the opportunity cost is negative.
20This assumption seems to be non-restrictive at least for one more reason. The capital
depreciation functions are generally of hyperbolic type (Mauer and Ott, 1995) with an
estimated rate of depreciation ￿ substantially high. Nevertheless, introducing a salvage
value in the valuation model would not substantially modify the results obtained as regards
the NPV and the Extended Net Present Value. Under the hypothesis of the salvage value
being equal to zero we obtain a cautious estimate of the ￿ exibility value.
17Figure 1:
FA assuming ￿ = 30% and i = 20% (in thousands of Euros).
Figure 2:
FA assuming ￿ = 40% and i = 20% (in thousands of Euros).
Figure 3:
Opportunity cost to defer the investment assuming ￿ = 30% and i = 20%
(in thousands of Euros).
Figure 4:
Opportunity cost to defer the investment assuming ￿ = 40% and i = 20%
(in thousands of Euros).
The analysis of ￿ exibility could have interesting e⁄ects in terms of pol-
icy and consumer surplus (i.e. tari⁄ reduction). The possibility of delaying
investment decisions may induce the ￿rm to bid more aggressively in order
to win the concession race (Muraro, 2002). For example assuming water
losses in the network equal to 20% and ￿ = 30%, the value of ￿ exibility has
a maximum for ￿ = 15 and ￿ = 9 years for ￿ = 1% and ￿ = 2% respec-
tively (Figure 1). For these reference cases the potential tari⁄ reductions
are displayed in Table 5.21
￿pmax FA ￿R
￿ = 1% 15 years 28%
￿ = 2% 9 years 4%
Table 5: Maximum tari⁄ reduction assuming ￿ = 30%:
3.2 The case of interdependent projects
Most of the investments occurring in the water service sector and in partic-
ular investments in aqueduct systems o⁄er a wide range of choice between
alternative technical solutions. In fact the planners can combine the single
plants and elements making up the system in several di⁄erent ways in or-
der to guarantee greater operational ￿ exibility (D￿ Alpaos, 2003). It is quite
common today to design complex aqueduct systems which can be expanded
by sequential or modularized investments. Such systems can easily be mod-
i￿ed over time in order to meet the requirements of facing and adapting to
changes in the state variables (e.g. future demand, number of users, input
cost increments, adoption of new technologies, etc.). This ￿ exibility arising
from technical aspects has an economic value.
21Assuming ￿ = 1% the NPV
A is negative, therefore we determined the tari⁄ reduction
assuming a Net Present Value equal to zero as the benchmark.
18As an example let￿ s consider a ￿rm￿ s need to invest in capacity expansion
in order to face uncertain future growth in demand and suppose it has the
opportunity of proceeding with sequential investments, whose characteristics
are analogous to those of alternative A described in section 4.1. Assuming
that the ￿rm can switch from a smaller scale project to a bigger scale one
by paying an additional cost. The costs related to di⁄erent discharge values
are displayed in Table 4.
Discharge (l/s)
300 900 1,200 1,500 2,100
I (Euro 103) 3,500 7,100 9,400 12,200 15,000
Table 4: Plant costs depending on di⁄erent discharge values.
By using (13) and (16) we can obtain the thresholds on the basis of
which we evaluate the pro￿tability of proceeding or not with a sequential
investment, with the investment in A occurring before B. The results of the
simulations we performed for di⁄erent discharge values assuming i = 20%
and ￿ = 30% are shown in Table 5 and 6.
The results clearly show the importance of scale economies in investment
decisions related to capacity expansion.22 When the dimension of project
A is equal to 300 l=s and the dimension of B is equal to 900 l=s, assuming
￿ = 2% and ￿ = 4%, the optimal investment strategy consists in investing
￿rst in A and then switching to B as soon as the instantaneous pro￿t ￿
becomes greater than the threshold ￿￿
AB. Everything else being equal, when
the dimension of project B is equal to or greater than 1200 l=s it is always
optimal to invest in the bigger scale project, i.e. the condition ￿￿
AB >
￿￿
A is satis￿ed. Assuming that project A is designed for a discharge value
greater than or equal to 900 l/s the optimal strategy consists in undertaking
sequential investments.
Moreover, since the condition ￿0 = 0:8 ￿ 0:3 ￿ 0:13 < ￿￿
A always obtains,
whenever it is optimal to invest in sequential investments, it is more prof-
itable to start constructing A (there is no time lag on A) and wait to invest
in project B (Table 5 and 6).
22Generally, in fact, the section of the supply network and distribution network are sized
on the basis of the average day demand thanks to the possibility of constructing reservoirs.
Construction costs, furthermore, depend on the length of the pipes according to a virtually
linear law. In this regard, see the study carried out by Venturi et al. (1970) on estimate
of the construction cost functions in parametric form for various types of plant.
19Analogous considerations can be made taking into account the results
shown in Tables 7 and 8 assuming ￿ = 40%, i = 20% and value losses of ￿
equal to 2% and 4% respectively. Everything else being equal, the trigger
￿￿
AB increases when ￿ increases.
Discharge (l/s)













































Table 5: Optimal trigger assuming ￿ = 2% and ￿ = 30%:
Discharge (l/s)













































Table 6: Optimal trigger assuming ￿ = 4% and ￿ = 30%:
Discharge (l/s)













































20Table 7: Optimal trigger assuming ￿ = 2% and ￿ = 40%.
Discharge (l/s)













































Table 8: Optimal trigger assuming ￿ = 4% and ￿ = 40%.
4 Final remarks
In this paper we propose an option approach to evaluate the strategic value
of ￿ exibility to defer investment decisions in the Italian water service sector.
We show how some technical ￿ exibility might turn into managerial ￿ exibility
which has a substantial economic value.
The value of ￿ exibility might be bene￿cial for the consumers. In fact if
the provider can choose whether and when it is optimal to invest, he might
bid more aggressively o⁄ering a lower tari⁄.
21A Appendix
Within the range of ￿ where it is non-optimal to invest in the larger scale
project, the value of alternative A can be obtained as the solution of the




￿￿ + (r ￿ ￿)￿V A
￿ ￿ rV A + ￿A = 0 (19)
subject to the following boundary conditions (value matching condition and
smooth pasting condition):
V A(￿￿
AB) = V B(￿￿
AB) ￿ IB and V A
￿ (￿￿
AB) = V B
￿ (￿￿
AB); (20)
The optimal timing to switch from A to B turns out to be:
￿￿
AB = min(t ￿ 0 j V A(￿￿
AB) = V B(￿￿
AB) ￿ IB): (21)
The general solution of equation (19) can be written as:
V A(￿) = K1￿￿ + K2￿￿ + vA(￿) (22a)
where 1 < ￿ < r=(r ￿ ￿); ￿ < 0 are respectively the positive and negative
root of the characteristic equation ￿(x) = 1
2￿2x(x ￿ 1) + (r ￿ ￿)x ￿ r = 0;
and K1; K2 are two constants to be determined. The ￿rst two terms in
(22a) represent the solution of the homogeneous equation, while the third
term represents a particular solution. As particular solution we take the
expected discounted value vA(￿) of the bene￿ts that project A generates in










(1 ￿ e￿￿T) (23)
To make sure vA(￿) is positive we assume ￿ > 0: Finally, in order to
have a ￿nite value for V A(￿) when ￿ gets very small, we set K2 = 0 (i.e.
lim￿!0 V A(￿) = 0). Therefore the general solution can be re-written in the
following form:
V A(￿) = K1￿￿ +
￿A
￿
(1 ￿ e￿￿T) (24)
Finally, since K1￿￿ represents the correction we have to impose on the
value of project A by the option to switch to B in the future, the constant
K1 must necessarily be positive. We obtain K1 and ￿￿
AB by imposing the
boundary conditions (20).
22B Appendix
Unlike what happens when dealing with the European Call Option, to eval-
uate a perpetual option we use a di⁄erential equation which is not time-
dependent.
Considering project A, the solution of (15) can be obtained by solving
the following second order di⁄erential equation (McDonald and Siegel 1986;




￿￿ + (r ￿ ￿)￿FA
￿ ￿ rFA = 0 (25)
imposing the usual boundary conditions:
FA(￿￿
A) = V A(￿￿
A) ￿ IA and FA
￿ (￿￿
A) = V A
￿ (￿￿
A); (26)
Nevertheless, when analyzing (14) (or 24) we notice that the expression
referring to the value of project A reveals two di⁄erent forms depending on
￿ < ￿￿
AB or vice versa ￿ > ￿￿
AB. Therefore we have two di⁄erent boundary
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